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Background: Healthcare-associated infections are a major source of morbidity and mortality in the United States.
Infection Preventionists (IPs) are healthcare workers tasked at overseeing the prevention and control of these
infections, but they may have difficulties obtaining up-to-date information, primarily in rural states. The objective of
this study was to evaluate the importance of public health involvement on the knowledge-sharing network of IPs
in a rural state.
Findings: A total of 95 attendees completed our survey. The addition of public health professionals increased the
density of the network, reduced the number of separate components of the network, and reduced the number of
key players needed to contact nearly all of the other network members. All network metrics were higher for public
health professionals than for IPs without public health involvement.
Conclusions: The addition of public health professionals involved in healthcare infection prevention activities
augmented the knowledge sharing potential of the IPs in Iowa. Rural states without public health involvement in
healthcare-associated infection (HAI) prevention efforts should consider the potential benefits of adding these
personnel to the public health workforce to help facilitate communication of HAI-related information.
Keywords: Knowledge sharing, Communication, Public health department, Healthcare-associated infections,
Social network, Key player, Rural health, InformationIntroduction
Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are a major
source of morbidity and mortality, causing an estimated
two million infections and 100,000 deaths each year [1].
From a public health perspective, the number of HAIs
exceeds the number of cases of any notifiable disease,
and the deaths associated with HAIs are greater than the
number of deaths attributable to several of the top ten
leading causes of death [1]. The importance of HAIs to
public health practice was highlighted by the addition of
a Healthy People 2020 goal to “prevent, reduce, and ul-
timately eliminate healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) ”
[2]. The steady increase in the number of states with
legislative mandates for the reporting of HAIs has in-
creased the need for communication between healthcare,* Correspondence: tlwiem01@louisville.edu
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Suite 380, Louisville, KY 40202, USA
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orpublic health, and government in terms of identify-
ing HAIs, reporting HAIs, and improving patient
outcomes.
Existing relationships between healthcare facility in-
fection preventionists (IPs) and their public health col-
leagues varies greatly from state to state. States such as
New York, California, and Pennsylvania have sophisti-
cated approaches to collaboration that have resulted in
advances in prevention efforts [3,4]. In rural states,
where a substantial number of hospitals are small critical
access hospitals, public health departments and IPs are
confronted with unique challenges. For example, with
the exception of a few studies, [5-9] basic epidemiologic
data on HAIs in rural states are missing from the litera-
ture. These lack of data prevent many targeted interven-
tions from ever being realized. Furthermore, rural states
may have limited resources compared to more metropol-
itan states, and therefore may be forced to leverage existing
relationships to implement interventions that rely heavilyral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Kentucky provides an example of such a rural state.
Kentucky has a population of approximately 4 million
[10] and is 56% rural [11]. By comparison, the US is
considered to be 19% rural [11]. A recent survey of
Kentucky’s IPs revealed that 25% have less than 5 years
of experience in that role, [12] they lack formal mentor-
ing programs, and their job responsibilities often ex-
ceed their education and experiential preparation [13].
In order to address this training and knowledge gap, it
is critical to understand how knowledge is shared
among these professionals. An analysis of the existing
knowledge-sharing network in Kentucky was conducted
in 2010, and found that there were distinct gaps in the
ability of the IPs to gain and share knowledge withTable 1 Study definitions
Term Definition
Alter A member of the network with
an IPs communication contacts [
Authority A member of the network that r
This person receives information
Betweenness Centrality How often a member of the net
path of two other members of t
mutual contact but cannot, them
contact serves as a broker of com
as he or she falls within the shor
Bridge A node connected to a diverse s
Centralization How much the network is cente
Clique A subgroup of members of the n
to every other member of the su
Component A sub-group that was not conne
Constraint A measure of bridging: low cons
Eigenvector Centrality The relative number of knowledg
For example, if an IP#1 has one a
amount of knowledge that can b
IP#2 and IP#3 (low eigenvector c
potential through the IP#1 to IP#
different communication paths w
Fragmentation Key Player A member of the network capab
as possible while taking into acc
fragmentation key players. This is
many pieces, cutting off certain
Hub A member of the network that p
provide information to potential
In-degree Centrality The number of times a member
Isolate A member of the network with
Knowledge Sharing Having exchanged infection prev
method with another member o
Node A survey respondent.
Out-degree Centrality The number of times a member
Reach Key Player A member of the network that h
largest proportion of other node
reach key players and the poten
of contacts that other members
with respect to the number of orespect to infection prevention and control [12]. One of
the recommendations from this study was to define
ways to increase knowledge sharing between IPs.
The state of Iowa is similar to Kentucky in that it is
predominantly rural (70%) and has a similar con-
figuration of hospital sizes [14]. Iowa differs from
Kentucky in that they have long-standing, state wide
healthcare-public health partnerships. These partner-
ships may provide a network structure more condu-
cive to knowledge sharing, resulting in decreased
efforts necessary in conducting and coordinating in-
fection prevention activities.
The purpose of this study was to define the role of
public health professionals on the knowledge-sharing
network of IPs in a rural state.whom another member of the network shares knowledge,
here, used only in the definition of eigenvector centrality].
eceives communication from many hubs.
from potentially important people in the network.
work falls between the shortest knowledge-sharing
he network. For example, if two IPs have a
selves, communicate with one another, their mutual
munication, a network node with high betweenness,
test communication path between the other two network members.
et of other nodes
red around a few central members.
etwork in which each person is connected
bgroup.
cted to any sub-group in the network.
traint indicates connection to others who are not themselves connected.
e-sharing episodes of a particular member of the networks alters.
lter (IP#2) who themselves has one alter (IP#3), the maximum
e gained by IP#1 is, at most, the sum of the knowledge of
entrality for IP#1). However, if IP#2 has 80 contacts, the knowledge
2 communication path is much greater since IP#2 has a lot of
ith which to obtain information (high eigenvector centrality).
le of holding the network together in as few components
ount the size of each component as well as the other
an IP that, if removed can break up the network into
members from obtaining information from the rest of the network.
rovide information many authorities. These members
ly important members of the network.
of the network was asked for knowledge.
no connections to any other member of the network.
ention-related information formally or informally via any
f the network in Iowa over the past 6 months.
of the network asked another member of the network for knowledge.
ad the capability of sharing knowledge with the
s in the network while taking into account the other
tial for redundant connections. This is an IP that has a lot
of the network do not share, making them a unique individual
ther members of the network with which they can communicate.
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Study design and population
A social network analysis was conducted to evaluate the
impact of public health professionals on the knowledge-
sharing network of IPs in Iowa. A whole network approach
was used [15]. A paper-based survey was provided to all
attendees at a statewide infection control meeting in
Iowa in May 2011. Instructions were given orally and
were included on the survey instrument. Completed sur-
veys were collected approximately 30 minutes after initi-
ation. The survey has been previously utilized in another
communication network protocol [16] and was pilot
tested prior to the previous study and the current study.
Study definitions
The analysis methodologies used in this study require
definition for an adequate understanding of the study
results. Brief definitions for the results reported below
can be found in Table 1. In-depth discussions of the
concepts can be found elsewhere [17,18].
Statistical analysis
Network cohesion was measured by density, clique, and
component analyses. Node centrality was measured using
in-degree, out-degree, betweenness, and eigenvector cen-
trality measures. Centralization indices were used to
demonstrate the level to which the network focused on
one particular central node. Bridges were identified using
the constraint statistic [19]. Hub and authority scores
were calculated using generalizations of eigenvector cen-
trality [20]. Key players in the network were identified
using the key player algorithm developed by Borgotti
and colleagues [21]. Both reach and fragmentation keyFigure 1 The knowledge sharing social-network of healthcare infectio
[Public health personnel are indicated with darker, square nodes in th
the primary site of employment and are approximate]. Note: Geocodinplayers were identified using sequential addition of key
players. The final number of key players in each analysis
was identified when the reach index or fragmentation
index did not increase more than 10% with the addition
of the extra key player [12]. The multiple group sizes al-
gorithm was used to compute the total number of key
players necessary to reach 100% of the other members
of the main component of the network. UCINET and
NETDRAW were used for all social network analyses
(Analytic Technologies, Lexington, KY). KeyPlayer v1
was used for identification of key players (Analytic Tech-
nologies, Lexington, KY). SAS v9.2 (SAS Inc. Cary, NC)
was used for other descriptive analyses.
To evaluate the impact of the public health depart-
ment coordination in Iowa, all analyses were conducted
twice: once with only the IPs and once with the IPs and
the health department personnel.
Human subjects protection
Institutional review board approval was granted by the
University of Louisville Human Subjects Protection
Office (Protocol #08.0399) prior to any data collection.
Written informed consent was waived for all data collec-
tion activities, and no data were collected from children.
Findings
A total of 95 attendees completed the survey instrument,
of which 4 were public health professionals (4%). This
represents 66% of the public health workforce that is
involved in infection prevention activities. Figure 1
depicts the knowledge-sharing social network of survey
respondents, geocoded to their primary site of
employment.n preventionists and public health department personnel in Iowa
e center of the figure – node locations are geocoded based on
g limits the ability to distinguish network components.
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to be IPs can be found in Table 2. The plurality of survey
respondents were in the 46-55-year age group (39%),
were female (95%), and had a 4-year college degree
(41%). A total of 23% were certified in infection control
through the Certification Board of Infection Control and
Epidemiology (CBIC). One third of respondents indi-
cated that they had practiced in their current position
for over 10 years, and almost half indicated having prac-
ticed infection prevention for over 10 years. Over twoTable 2 Demographic characteristics of 91 responding







Female Gender 86 (94.5)
Education
2-3 Year College (Including RN) 35 (38.5)
4 Year College 37 (40.7)
Master Degree 16 (17.6)
Professional Degree (ARNP, PA, etc.) 2 (2.2)
CIC Certification 22 (23.3)
APIC Member 69 (76.7)
Regular APIC Meeting Attendance – Local Chapter 51 (56.7)
Regular APIC Meeting Attendance – Statewide Meeting 61 (67.0)
Time in Current Position
Less than 1 Year 11 (12.1)
1-2 years 10 (11.0)
3-5 years 22 (24.2)
6-10 Years 19 (20.9)
More than 10 Years 29 (31.9)
Daily Efforts in Infection Prevention
<20% 20 (22.0)
20%-50% 26 (28.6)
More than 50% but less than 100% 17 (18.7)
100% 28 (30.8)
Length of Career in Infection Prevention
Less than 1 Year 10 (11.1)
1-2 years 7 (7.8)
3-5 years 15 (16.7)
6-10 Years 16 (17.8)
More than 10 Years 42 (46.7)
Affiliation with an Academic Center 15 (16.5)
Use of the National Healthcare Safety Network 60 (65.9)thirds of respondents specified having less than 100% of
their daily efforts devoted to the practice of infection
prevention.
Table 3 reports the centrality and centralization stat-
istics for the knowledge-sharing network for IPs and for
the public health professionals. All network statistics
were higher for public health professionals than for
IPs without public health involvement. Furthermore,
the in-degree and betweenness centralization indices
were higher for public health professionals (in-degree
13%, betweenness 10%) than for IPs (in-degree 9%, be-
tweenness 6%).
Table 4 describes the cohesion and key player statistics
for the network. The network with the public health
professionals increased the network density from 1.7%
to 1.9%, and reduced the number of isolates and compo-
nents. In the network without the public health profes-
sionals, 11 reach key players were able to contact just
over 70% of the network. In the network with the
addition of public health professionals, two less reach
key players were needed (n = 9) to reach a similar pro-
portion of other members of the network. Furthermore,
two fewer reach key players (n = 23 versus n = 21) were
needed to reach 100% of the other members of the main
component of the network. Four meaningful fragmenta-
tion key players were found in the network without the
public health professionals and when removed, produced
a 54% fragmentation index. Three meaningful frag-
mentation key players were found with the addition of
the public health professionals, and produced a 34%
fragmentation index upon removal. Finally, the lowest
non-zero constraint score was held by a public health
professional (0.083).
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that complementing the IP
knowledge network with public health professionals may
increase the ability of IPs to share knowledge with each
other. Since many IPs in Iowa communicate with the
public health department regarding HAIs those public
health professions play a unique role within the struc-
ture of the Iowa network. Our findings that public
health professionals in Iowa have higher network statis-
tics suggest that these members have important struc-
tural roles within the infection prevention knowledge
network. The higher in-degree statistics for public health
professionals suggest that they are contacted by many
IPs, while higher out-degree statistics suggest they pro-
vide information to many members of the network. The
larger betweenness statistics suggest public health pro-
fessionals can connect otherwise disconnected members
of the network, and higher eigenvector statistics sug-
gest that these members contact IPs who themselves
contact a large number of other IPs. These findings
Table 3 Centrality and centralization statistics of the knowledge-sharing social network of hospital-based infection
preventionists and public health pofessionals in Iowa
Variable Median (Range) Median (Range) Centralization Centralization
IPs Public Health IPs Public Health
In-degree 1 (0–13) 4.5 (3 – 19) 9% 13%
Out-degree 4 (0–5) 4.5 (2–5) 2% 2%
Betweenness 1.3 (0 – 950.5) 923.0 (509.2-1406.2) 6% 10%
Eigenvector 0.04 (0–0.32) 0.02 (0.13 – 0.32) 44% 40%
Hub 0.04 (0 – 0.28) 0.07 (0.05-0.14) - -
Authority 0.01 (0 – 0.47) 0.13 (0.08 – 0.57) - -
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through this network when provided to public health
professionals.
One important finding was that public health mem-
bers are able to connect otherwise isolated IPs. Although
the density of the network did not increase a great deal
(0.2%) with the addition of public health professionals,
they added 62 communication ties to the network, a very
large number for only 4 additional members. These add-
itional ties will allow network members to maintain
communication if some IPs leave their positions. Key
player metrics further demonstrated the importance of
these members within the knowledge-sharing network.
With the addition of the public health members, com-
munication between nearly every member of the net-
work was possible after initiating communication through
a smaller set of key members. In the event of a pan-
demic or outbreak, it is critical to quickly convey new
information to nearly every member of the network, and
focusing communication efforts on these reach key play-
ers may provide an ideal mechanism for improving the
flow of information. Finally, we found that the public
health members reduced the network fragmentation upon
removal of fragmentation key players. Because of the
presence of these public health professionals and theirTable 4 Cohesion and key player statistics for the knowledge





Isolates n = 11
Components n = 3
Cliques n = 4
Key Pla
Reach Key Players n = 4 (72%
For 100% Reach of Main Component n = 23
Fragmentation Key Players n = 4 (54%unique placement within the structure of the network,
the network will be less affected when other members
leave the network (e.g. retirement or changing jobs).
Another important concept in communication net-
works is “bridging”. Members who represent bridges are
capable of connecting members of a network that do not
readily connect with each other. These members are
considered to be personnel with critical influence for im-
proving team performance in a network [19,22,23]. Here,
we identified that the network member with the lowest
constraint score (indicative of a good bridge) was a pub-
lic health professional. This bridge allows for dissemin-
ation of information from diverse areas of the network.
As various areas of the network may hold members with
different areas of expertise, bridges allow for this expert-
ise to flow to and from these areas. For example, if some
IPs in a network are strong in prevention of ventilator-
associated pneumonia, and another is proficient with
use of the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN),
the network bridge is capable of connecting these IPs.
Bridges are particularly important in a rural state where
most of the hospitals are critical access hospitals. In
these facilities, IPs have multiple demands and limited
resources, making it difficult to gain expertise in mul-









Reachable) n = 3 (74% Reachable)
n = 21
Fragmentation) n = 3 (34% Fragmentation)
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of gathering and disseminating a wide variety of HAI-
related information.
Another possible method of increasing knowledge
sharing is periodic statewide meetings of infection pre-
ventionists [12]. However, despite the presence of a
long-standing annual statewide IP meeting in Iowa,
there were many similarities between the Iowa and the
Kentucky IP knowledge-sharing networks. Both of these
knowledge-sharing networks had similar numbers of
components, similar densities and similar skewed node
centrality scores. Also, these networks shared similar
numbers of reach key players that could reach approxi-
mately the same proportion of other IPs in the network
[12]. These findings were surprising, as we originally
thought that the longstanding statewide meeting in Iowa
would have led to a much different more connected net-
work in Iowa compared to Kentucky. Iowa does have
regular APIC chapter meetings, which are similar to the
structure within Kentucky. These local chapter meetings
may also be a mechanism for communication in this
group of professionals outside of the statewide meeting.
This suggests that local APIC chapter meetings function
similarly in both Iowa and Kentucky with regard to
knowledge sharing. However, it appears that the only
major differences in the networks are the addition of the
public health professionals.
Our study has several limitations, including the possi-
bility of missing data. As not every member of the
knowledge-sharing network attended the statewide meet-
ing, it is possible that important members of the net-
work were not included in this analysis, thereby biasing
the results. A basic assumption in knowledge sharing is
that the information that is shared is correct, which may
not be the case. The knowledge network may be respon-
sible for the sharing of misinformation that may, in fact,
be detrimental to HAI elimination efforts. Although gen-
eralizability to other states may be limitation, it is im-
portant to emphasize that public health professionals
may play important functional roles for bolstering com-
munication in metropolitan states as well as rural states.
The ability of these professionals to focus infection
prevention activities, as well as their key placement in
public health departments suggests that their roles in
supporting communication may apply to all types of
facilities in all states.
Despite these limitations, our results demonstrate that
public health officials play an important role in the
communication network among IPs in Iowa. Iowa and
Kentucky are similar in terms of the percentage of
population living in rural regions, but in Iowa the state
health department is more involved with coordinating
HAI prevention. Future research efforts should be de-
voted to discovering what kinds of information travelacross these communication networks, and understand-
ing how the metrics we present affect real-world knowl-
edge sharing.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our results suggest that the addition of
public health professionals involved in the coordination
of healthcare infection prevention activities may aug-
ment knowledge sharing among IPs in rural states.
Given the importance of HAIs, rural states without pub-
lic health involvement in infection prevention should
consider the potential benefits of adding these personnel
to the public health workforce.
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